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THE DESIRABILITY OF DEPOLITICIZATION: COMPLIANCE IN THE 





There are divergent perspectives on the appropriate role of politics in the compliance 
systems 1  of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Some commentators 
have described MEA compliance mechanisms as providing ‘a political solution 
through gentle political pressure, consultation, and negotiations’, 2  and as being 
‘political and pragmatic, not legalistic’.3 According to Chayes and Chayes, a ‘co-
operative, problem-solving approach’ to promoting compliance with international 
regulatory agreements such as MEAs is desirable.4 Others, by contrast, have observed 
that MEA compliance procedures are increasingly analogous to administrative 
procedures,5 reflecting a tendency towards more formal and rule-based processes. 
…  
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1 Compliance systems may be defined as encompassing performance review information, multilateral 
non-compliance procedures, and non-compliance response measures: United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), ‘Compliance Mechanisms Under Selected Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements’ (2007), available at: http://www.unep.org/pdf/delc/Compliance_Mechanism_final.pdf, at 
p. 9. 
2 N. Goeteyn and F. Maes, ‘Compliance Mechanisms in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An 
Effective Way to Improve Compliance?’ (2011) 10 Chinese Journal of International Law, pp. 791-826, 
at 826.  
3 D. Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press, 
2009), at p. 248. 
4 A. Chayes & A. H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1998), at p. 3. 
5 A. Tanzi & C. Pitea, ‘Non-Compliance Mechanisms: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward’ in T. 
Treves et al. (eds.), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Agreements (TMC Asser Press, 2009), pp. 569-580, at 580; K. N. Scott, 
‘Non-Compliance Procedures and the Resolution of Disputes under International Environmental 
Agreements’ in D. French, M. Saul and N. D. White (eds.), International Law and Dispute Settlement: 
New Problems and Techniques (Hart, 2010), pp. 225-270, at 230. 
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Klabbers has expressed concern that compliance processes are in practice ‘subject to 
negotiations’,6 and would prefer greater reliance on formalism, procedural safeguards 
and the rule of law.7 These various characterizations of the actual and normatively 
appropriate role of politics in MEA compliance systems can be seen to reflect a 
broader tension between ideals of state sovereignty and a law-based international 
order8 that permeates the international realm.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol 9  to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change10 (‘UNFCCC’) adopted a ‘prescriptive, quantitative, time-bound, compliance-
backed approach’ to climate change mitigation. 11  This Protocol applied to 37 
industrialized countries and the European Union during its first commitment period 
from 2008-2012, which is the focus of this article. The compliance system developed 
under this Protocol is remarkable for its attempts to depoliticize compliance processes 
in international environmental law (IEL),12  and create autonomous, arm’s length, 
technocratic and rule-based compliance processes.13 The Kyoto compliance system 
…  
6 J. Klabbers, ‘Compliance Procedures’ in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnee & E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 995-1009, at 
1001.  
7 Ibid, at pp. 1007-9.  
8 See generally O. A. Hathaway, ‘International Delegation and State Sovereignty’ (2007) 71 Law & 
Contemporary Problems, pp. 115-149, at 115.  
9 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto (Japan), 11 
Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf 
(‘Kyoto Protocol’).  
10 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, 
available at: http://unfccc.int/key_documents/the_convention/items/2853.php, at Art. 1 (‘UNFCCC’). 
11 L. Rajamani, J. Brunnee & M. Doelle, ‘Introduction: The Role of Compliance in an Evolving 
Climate Regime’ in J. Brunnee, M. Doelle & L. Rajamani (eds.), Promoting Compliance in an 
Evolving Climate Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at p. 7. 
12 G. Ulfstein, ‘Depoliticizing Compliance’ in Brunnee, Doelle & Rajamani (eds.), n. 11 above, at p. 
418. Ulfstein’s account of the attempts to depoliticize compliance in the Kyoto compliance system 
primarily focuses on the Enforcement Branch. The discussion that follows adds to Ulfstein’s account 
by, inter alia, teasing out the roles of the expert review process, and the bypassing of the Facilitative 
Branch, in limiting attempts to depoliticize the Kyoto compliance system.  
13 This definition of depoliticization draws inspiration from what Dubash and Morgan define as the 
‘rules’ end of a spectrum between ‘rules and deals’ in the context of theorising the regulatory State in 
the global South: N. Dubash & B. Morgan, ‘The Embedded Regulatory State: Between Rules and 
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incorporates a number of components: (1) requirements for national measurement and 
reporting of Annex 1 states’ emissions inventories; (2) internationally coordinated 
external verification and review of national emissions inventories by expert review 
teams (ERTs); (3) the resolution of compliance issues and determination of 
consequences for non-compliance by the regime’s Compliance Committee, which 
consists of the bureau, plenary and Facilitative and Enforcement Branches;14 and (4) 
ultimate oversight by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).15 The Kyoto compliance system thus provides a 
sophisticated administrative apparatus for review of state action by independent 
bodies.16  
 
This article examines the extent to which the ideals of insulating compliance 
processes from undue political influence were achieved in practice in the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period. The point of departure for this discussion is that 
moves towards depoliticizing compliance and increasing reliance on formal, arm’s 
length and rule-based procedures are generally normatively desirable in IEL. This is 
because, as Koskenniemi rightly observes, without a degree of formalism, and 
adherence to ‘previously agreed rules, institutions and procedural safeguards’, law’s 
status to justify the exercise of constraint over states is seriously undermined. 17 
Moreover, it is argued that depoliticization of MEA compliance systems is desirable 
bo 
Deals’ in N. Dubash & B. Morgan, The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: Infrastructure and 
Development in Emerging Economies (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 279-96, at 279-83. 
14 J. Bulmer, ‘Compliance Regimes in Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ in Brunnee, Doelle & 
Rajamani (eds.), n. 11 above, at p. 66. 
15 J. Brunnee, ‘Climate Change and Compliance and Enforcement Processes’ in S. V. Scott & R. G. 
Rayfuse (eds.), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2012), pp. 
290-320, at 303-4; A. Zahar, ‘Verifying Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Annex I Parties: Methods We 
Have and Methods We Want’ (2010) 1 Climate Law, pp. 409-27, at 411.  
16 A. Zahar, J. Peel & L. Godden, Australian Climate Law in Global Context (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), at p. 126. 
17 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the 
Montreal Protocol’ (1992) 3(1) Yearbook of International Environmental Law, pp. 123-62, at 147.  
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to enhance the reliability and consistency of the review processes underpinning 
assessments of states’ compliance with their international environmental obligations.  
 
One notable aspect of attempts to depoliticize the Kyoto compliance system is the 
extensive reliance on putatively independent technical experts in the ERTs18 and the 
Facilitative and Enforcement Branches,19 which contrasts with compliance bodies in 
other global MEA compliance systems that are comprised of representatives of a 
restricted number of Parties.20 Expert involvement in decision-making processes may 
increase the range of considerations taken into account and the sophistication of the 
ensuing debate, thus enhancing the input legitimacy of compliance decision-making 
processes. 21  However, the relationship between expertise and depoliticization 
deserves further unpacking. 
 
There is a paradox associated with expert involvement in international law, which is 
brought to the fore by the extensive reliance on technical and legal experts in the 
Kyoto compliance system. On one hand, it is acknowledged that experts are not 
simply ‘neutral mouthpieces of science’ or law, and construct knowledge by the 
…  
18 Members of ERTs shall ‘serve in their individual capacities’ and have ‘recognized competence in the 
areas to be reviewed’: Decision 22/CMP.1, Guidelines for Review Under Article 8 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, 30 Mar. 2006, at paras. 23 and 24. 
19 Members of the Compliance Committee are required to ‘serve in their individual capacities’ and 
shall have ‘recognized competence relating to climate change and in relevant fields such as the 
scientific, technical, socio-economic or legal fields’: Decision 27/CMP.1, Procedures and Mechanisms 
Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3Annex, 30 Mar. 
2006, Annex, at section II, para. 6.  
20 See nn. 98-9 below. The focus of this article is on global MEAs, rather than regional MEAs such as 
the Aarhus Convention, which is relatively highly depoliticized but operates against a different political 
backdrop to global environmental agreements: see Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus (Denmark), 
25 Jun. 1998, in force 30 Oct. 2001, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html. 
21 M. Ambrus, K. Arts, E. Hey & H. Raulus, ‘The Role of Experts in International and European 
Decision-making Processes: Setting the Scene’ in M. Ambrus, K. Arts, E. Hey & H. Raulus (eds.), The 
Role of ‘Experts’ in International and European Decision-Making Processes: Advisors, Decision 
Makers or Irrelevant Actors? (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 1-16, at 6. 
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processes of prioritizing, interpreting and framing available information.22 That is, it 
is inevitable that there will be political dimensions to expert decision-making.23 On 
the other hand, the legitimacy of experts’ knowledge hinges on perceptions that it is 
not significantly skewed by personal or political preferences. It is the achievement of 
this aspiration – that expertise is not unduly biased – that reflects alignment between 
ideals of technocratic decision-making and depoliticization. Otherwise, as Werner 
notes, ‘[i]f it is not possible to identify rules separated from day-to-day politics, 
international [expert] advice becomes indistinguishable from other types of political 
advice and loses its own specific legitimizing function’.24  
 
This article argues that the aspiration of expert decision-making that is perceived to be 
free from political bias is put under strain by ERTs’ simultaneous roles of technical 
review and compliance facilitation within the Kyoto compliance system, and the 
centrality of these roles within the compliance hierarchy. It is suggested that the roles 
of negotiation, facilitation, diplomacy and cooperation assumed by ERTs led to 
political considerations shaping review processes in the first commitment period. The 
degree to which ERTs assumed these facilitative roles was perhaps unanticipated by 
the institutional designers of the Kyoto compliance system, who created a separate 
Facilitative Branch with extensive facilitative powers that were safeguarded by 
numerous due process guarantees.25 Given the likelihood of a continued, and arguably 
increasingly important, role for national reporting and internationally coordinated 
…  
22 W. G. Werner, ‘The Politics of Expertise: Applying Paradoxes of Scientific Expertise to 
International Law’ in Ambrus, Arts, Hey & Raulus, n. 21 above, at p. 56.  
23 L. Schrefler, ‘Reflections on the Different Roles of Expertise in Regulatory Policy Making’ in 
Ambrus, Arts, Hey & Raulus, n. 21 above, at p. 76. 
24 Werner, n. 22 above, at p. 56.  
25 See discussion in Part 4.1 below. 
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expert review in the emerging international climate architecture,26 the dual political 
and technical roles currently played by ERTs need to be taken into account in 
designing appropriate procedural safeguards for future compliance processes.27 
 
The following discussion highlights at least two issues of salience for the field of 
transnational environmental law. First, one focus of this field is the roles played by 
non-state actors,28 which include technical experts. In particular, it is suggested that 
the network of technical experts from which ERTs are selected29 may be seen as 
‘transnational’ as it involves private, non-state actors operating across national 
borders and significantly influencing international climate governance.30 However, 
the independent technical experts that become members of ERTs are nominated by 
Parties and acting as officials of the Kyoto compliance system, blurring the 
boundaries between their private and public roles.31 The related issue of the tension 
between ERTs’ dual technical and political roles is a central theme in this article.    
 
Secondly, aspects of the following discussion are informed by understandings from 
global administrative law (GAL), which Sand describes as an ‘essential component’ 
…  
26 J. Morgan, ‘The Emerging Post-Cancun Climate Regime’ in Brunnee, Doelle & Rajamani (eds.), n. 
11 above, at pp. 26, 34; R. Lefeber & S. Oberthur, ‘Key Features of the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance 
System’ in Brunnee, Doelle & Rajamani (eds.), n. 11 above, at pp.100-1. See also Part V below.  
27 Ulfstein has similarly argued that ‘Due process guarantees (“procedural safeguards”) are a quid pro 
quo [of depoliticization] in the sense that empowered independent organs should be subject to 
procedural control’: Ulfstein, n. 12 above, at p. 418.  
28 V. Heyvaert and T. Etty, ‘Introducing Transnational Environmental Law’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law pp. 1-11, at 6. 
29 UNFCCC, ‘UNFCCC Roster of Experts’ (2014), available at: http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/roe/.  
30 This aligns with the definition of ‘transnational’ provided by Abbott: ‘An institution, regime or 
regime complex is transnational when (i) private actors (such as environmental NGOs, business 
enterprises and technical experts) and/or sub-national governmental units (cities or provinces, for 
example) play significant roles in its governance, instead of or in addition to states and/or IGOs; and 
(ii) it operates across national borders’: K. W. Abbott, ‘Strengthening the Transnational Regime 
Complex for Climate Change’ (2014) 3(1) Transnational Environmental Law pp. 57-88, at 65. 
31 Ibid, at p. 67.  
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of the field of transnational environmental law.32 One of the primary focal points for 
GAL is the adoption of domestic administrative law-type mechanisms, such as those 
pertaining to accountability, transparency, participation, reason-giving and review, in 
global regulatory bodies.33 A key normative concern of GAL is the role of rules and 
decisions of an administrative character operating to ‘limit decisions on the basis of 
power and expediency’,34 which is consonant with this article’s focus on efforts to 
depoliticize the Kyoto compliance system by creating autonomous and proceduralized 
compliance processes. As Scott notes, the aptness of GAL observations to MEA 
compliance processes is ‘undeniable’,35 and this is particularly true in the case of the 
international climate regime in which ‘administrative regulation is most developed’.36 
 
The remainder of the article will be structured as follows. Part 2 contextualizes the 
following discussion by providing an overview of the elements of the Kyoto 
compliance system. Parts 3 and 4 consider the extent to which attempts to depoliticize 
the ERT and the Compliance Committee processes, respectively, have been realized 
in practice. Part 5 then discusses the significance of the current and likely future 
compliance trajectories under the international climate regime, before concluding 
remarks are offered in Part 6. 
 
…  
32 P. H. Sand, ‘The Evolution of Transnational Environmental Law: Four Cases in Historical 
Perspective’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law pp. 183-198, at 185.   
33 B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch & R. B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 
Law and Contemporary Problems pp. 15-61, 16, 18, 28. See also N. Krisch & B. Kingsbury, 
‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ 
(2006) 17(1) The European Journal of International Law 1-13, and the other articles in this 
Symposium issue of the European Journal of International Law, at pp. 1-278. 
34 See, eg, R. B. Stewart, ‘Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, 
Participation, and Responsiveness’ (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law pp. 211-70, at 
220.  
35 Scott, n. 5 above, at p. 230.  
36 J. Gupta, ‘Developing Countries: Trapped in the Web of Sustainable Development Governance’ in 
O. Dilling, M. Herberg & G. Winter (eds.), Transnational Administrative Rule-Making: Performance, 
Legal Effects, and Legitimacy (Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 305-33, at 309. 
	 8
	
2. CONTEXTUALIZING THE KYOTO COMPLIANCE SYSTEM 
MEA compliance systems can be defined as encompassing:   
 
 A requirement for information reviewing national performance of MEA obligations 
(‘performance review information’);  
 Institutionalized multilateral procedures to consider apparent instances of non-compliance 
(‘multilateral non-compliance procedures’); and 
 Multilateral measures adopted to respond to non-compliance (‘non-compliance response 
measures’).37  
 
The Kyoto compliance system contains each of these three features, and a brief 
overview of each follows. 
 
Performance review mechanisms 
Compared to other MEA performance measurement systems, 38  the measurement, 
reporting and verification provisions in Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol 
represent a sophisticated approach to collecting performance review information. 
Under Article 5, Parties are required to establish national systems to estimate GHG 
inventories and removals using the common metric of carbon dioxide equivalents. 
Tiered methodological approaches to preparing emissions inventories are provided by 
specified guidance materials produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, the use of which was mandatory in the first commitment period.39 Article 7 
of the Protocol stipulates requirements for Parties’ submission of national emissions 
…  
37 UNEP, n. 1 above, at p. 9. The author of this report uses the phrase ‘compliance mechanisms’ rather 
than ‘compliance systems’ in relation to these points. However, the phrase ‘compliance systems’ is 
considered preferable for the purposes of this article as the focus is on the synergistic operation of the 
multiple tiers within the Kyoto compliance hierarchy. The author also includes ‘dispute settlement 
procedures’ as a fourth compliance mechanism, however, because such procedures have not been used 
in the Kyoto compliance system, and are not directly relevant to the arguments in this article, they will 
not be a focus here. 
38 K. Raustiala, Reporting and Review Institutions in 10 Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(UNEP, 2001), available at: http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/C08-0025-Raustiala-
Reporting.pdf; Treves et al., n. 5 above.  
39 Kyoto Protocol, n. 9 above, Art. 5(2); A. Herold, ‘Experiences with Articles 5, 7, and 8: Defining the 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System under the Kyoto Protocol’ in Brunnee, Doelle & 
Rajamani, n. 11 above, at p. 125. 
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information, the review of which is then conducted by independent third party ERTs 
under Article 8. In practice, a primary focus of such review processes is the 
completeness and reliability of national emissions inventories,40 which are arguably 
the ‘foundation on which the rest of the international climate regime is built’.41  
 
Multilateral non-compliance procedures 
The legal basis for the Protocol’s elaborate compliance system stems from Article 18, 
which mandated the development of ‘appropriate and effective procedures and 
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance’, including through 
‘the development of an indicative list of consequences’. After complicated and 
occasionally fraught negotiations, the Protocol’s non-compliance procedure was 
adopted by Decision 27/CMP.142 at the first CMP in 2006. Several key procedural 
elements were subsequently clarified in the Rules of Procedure of the Compliance 
Committee to the Kyoto Protocol adopted by Decision 4/CMP.243 at the second CMP 
in 2007.44   
 
There are three ways in which the non-compliance procedure can be triggered: (1) by 
an ERT report; (2) by the self-nomination of a Party who is not in compliance; and (3) 
by one Party with respect to another Party provided the initiating Party provides 
‘corroborating information’. 45  In practice, the role of ERTs in triggering non-
…  
40 A. Zahar, ‘Does Self-Interest Skew State Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions? A Preliminary 
Analysis Based on the First Verified Emissions Estimates Under the Kyoto Protocol’ (2010) 1 Climate 
Law, pp. 313-24, at 315. 
41 Zahar, Peel & Godden, n. 16 above, at p. 96.  
42 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above. 
43 Decision 4/CMP.2, ‘Compliance Committee’, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1, 4 Mar. 
2007. 
44 S. Urbinati, ‘Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to 
the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ in Treves et al., n. 5 above, at pp. 
65-6. 
45 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XI, para. 1. 
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compliance matters has proved to be vital.46 Within seven days of the non-compliance 
procedure being triggered, the bureau will allocate the matter to the appropriate 
branch of the Compliance Committee. 
 
This Committee was established as the body responsible for resolving compliance 
issues and determining the consequences of non-compliance under Decision 
27/CMP.1.47 Within the Committee, the roles of the Facilitative and Enforcement 
Branches are bifurcated to reflect the compliance procedures and mechanisms’ 
various facilitation, compliance promotion and enforcement-oriented aims. 48  The 
Facilitative Branch is tasked with advising on and facilitating implementation for all 
Parties, and promoting Annex I Parties’49 compliance with Protocol commitments that 
do not relate to emissions reductions commitments,50 taking into account the principle 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities’.51 It is also 
intended to serve an ‘early-warning’ function for potential non-compliance in relation 
to emissions targets and methodological and reporting requirements.52 By contrast, 
the Enforcement Branch has a mandate to take significantly stronger measures in 
response to questions involving emissions reductions commitments and related 
reporting and eligibility requirements ‘taking into account the cause, type, degree and 
…  
46 Lefeber & Oberthur, n. 26 above, at p. 86.  
47 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section II. 
48 Decision 27/CMP.1 states that the procedures and mechanisms’ objectives are to ‘facilitate, promote 
and enforce compliance’: ibid, at section I.  
49 That is, developed countries and countries in transition. Other categories of countries under the 
UNFCCC include Annex II countries, which includes members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the European Community, and non-Annex I Parties, which are 
developing countries: Urbinati, n. 44 above, at p. 64. 
50 Stated differently, the mandate of the Facilitative Branch is to address questions of implementation 
that are not within the purview of the Enforcement Branch: G. Ulfstein & J. Werksman, ‘The Kyoto 
Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforcement’ in O. S. Stokke, J. Hovi & G. Ulfstein (eds.), 
Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance (Earthscan, 2005), pp. 39-62, at 45. 
51 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section IV, para. 4. 
52 S. Oberthur, ‘Options for a Compliance Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement’ (2014) 4 Climate 
Law pp. 30-49, at 40.  
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frequency of the non-compliance of that Party’. 53  The plenary serves as a link 
between the Compliance Committee and the CMP, and plays a largely administrative 
role.54  
 
Non-compliance response measures  
In the event of a finding of non-compliance, the Facilitative Branch has recourse to a 
number of ‘soft’ responses, including provision of advice regarding implementation, 
financial and technical assistance, and the formulation of recommendations.55 The 
significantly more intrusive consequences of a finding of non-compliance available to 
the Enforcement Branch include the requirement of a ‘compliance action plan’ for 
remedying non-compliance with methodological and reporting requirements,56 states’ 
suspension from participating in the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms57 if the non-
compliance issue concerns the eligibility requirements,58 and deductions from future 
emissions allocations if a Party’s emission target is exceeded.59 A Party can appeal to 
the CMP against a decision of the Enforcement Branch if it believes it has been 
denied due process and the decision ‘relates to’ Article 3(1) of the Kyoto Protocol 
regarding national emissions targets.60 
 
3. THE RE-ASSERTION OF POLITICS IN THE ERT PROCESS 
…  
53 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XV, para. 1; J. Brunnee, ‘Promoting Compliance with 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ in Brunnee, Doelle & Rajamani (eds.), n. 11 above, at p. 50. 
54 Lefeber & Oberthur, n. 26 above, at pp. 81-2.  
55 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XIV. 
56 Ibid, at section XV, para. 5(b). 
57 The three flexibility mechanisms are joint implementation, the clean development mechanism and 
emissions trading: see Kyoto Protocol, n. 9 above, Arts. 6, 12 and 17, respectively. 
58 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XV, para. 5(c). 
59 Specifically, a ‘deduction from the Party’s assigned amount for the second commitment period of a 
number of tonnes equal to 1.3 times the amount in tonnes of excess emissions’: Ibid, at section XV, 
para. 5(a). 
60 Ibid, at section XI, para. 1.  
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The Kyoto compliance system represents a sophisticated administrative apparatus for 
holding states to account for their international environment commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, experience during the first commitment period indicates 
that there is considerable dissonance between the extent of depoliticization reflected 
in the compliance rules, and decision-making in practice. In this Part, it will be argued 
that the procedures for impartial and autonomous technical review by ERTs have 
been undermined by simultaneous expectations on ERTs to respect state sovereignty 
and the diplomatic customs of international law. This has negative implications for 
the reliability and consistency of ERTs’ review processes.  
 
3.1. Deference to State Sovereignty in Review Practices  
Despite the ostensibly technical nature of expert review of states’ national emissions 
inventories, considerable deference to state sovereignty is expected in the review 
process. The review requirements to be fulfilled by ERTs are articulated in Article 8 
of the Protocol, which includes a requirement at sub-paragraph (3) that ‘[t]he review 
process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of all 
aspects of the implementation by a Party of [the] Protocol’. Inventories are to be 
reviewed against the basic principles of transparency, consistency, comparability, 
completeness and accuracy, as required by the UNFCCC reporting guidelines.61 The 
main focus of such review processes, which consist primarily of desk reviews, and 




61 UNFCCC, Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the 
Convention: UNFCCC Guidelines on Reporting and Review, FCCC/CP/20002/8, 28 Mar. 2003, 
Section B, para. 2. 
62 Zahar, n. 40 above, at p. 315. 
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In practice, there is considerable uncertainty associated with quantifying GHG 
emissions, leading to reliance on estimation techniques,63 which can undermine the 
accuracy and completeness of states’ emissions reports. This means that whilst 
reviewed emissions inventories may be deemed to be legally compliant, they may not 
be ‘in scientific compliance’. 64  The main checks ERTs can make relate to: (1) 
comparisons with a state’s historically reported data; (2) conformity with standard 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change methodologies; (3) country-level 
statistics on the production, import and export of fuel from the International Energy 
Agency; and (4) comparisons with the types of issues reported in other states’ reports 
(four reports are typically scrutinized by an ERT in a six-day, centralized review 
process).65 Non-state sources are not to be consulted in verifying states’ emissions 
information unless the government of the state under review formally supplied that 
data.66 In other words, ERTs may compare the consistency of information states have 
reported to various international bodies, and may undertake procedural and other 
types of consistency checks, but cannot independently verify the emissions 
information reported by states.  
 
The expectation of ERTs’ reliance on official materials produced by sovereign states 
contrasts with the more wide-ranging powers for collecting compliance information 
that are available to the Enforcement Branch,67 and places a significant limitation 
upon ERTs’ capacity to meaningfully review the accuracy and completeness of states’ 
…  
63 Ulfstein & Werksman, n. 50 above, at p. 52; R. Simnett, M. Nugent & A. Huggins, ‘Developing an 
International Assurance Standard on Greenhouse Gas Statements’ (2009) 23 Accounting Horizons, pp. 
347-63, at 353-4. 
64 T. Berntsen, J. Fuglestvedt & F. Stordal, ‘Reporting and Verification of Emissions and Removals of 
Greenhouse Gases’ in Stokke, Hovi & Ulfstein (eds.), n. 50 above, at p. 85.  
65 Zahar, Peel & Godden, n. 16 above, at pp. 105-6. 
66 Ibid at p. 119, citing Secretariat (UNFCCC), Handbook for Review of National GHG Inventories 
(undated), at pp. 11-2. 
67 See the discussion in Part 4.2 below describing the more far-reaching review powers of the 
Enforcement Branch.  
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emissions reports. Considering the significant authority that ERTs have assumed 
within the Kyoto compliance system, it is concerning that their ability to provide 
rigorous review of states’ emission information is so heavily constrained. As the 
following discussion demonstrates, this is just one of many ways in which deference 
to state sovereignty is expected of ERTs.  
 
3.2. The Reliability and Consistency of Review Processes 
There is a considerable disconnect between the technical and ostensibly depoliticized 
roles of ERTs evidenced in the compliance rules, and the realities of their roles and 
decision-making in practice. The compliance rules and procedures require members 
of ERTs serve in their personal capacities – that is, as technical experts, rather than as 
state representatives 68  – and may not participate in reviews of their country of 
origin,69 prima facie promoting impartiality. To achieve geographical representation, 
ERTs are typically comprised of six experts from diverse countries, excluding the 
country under review. In determining the composition of these teams, the Secretariat 
aims to ensure an appropriate balance between representatives from Annex 1 and non-
Annex 1 Parties (of the two lead reviewers for each review, one is from an Annex 1 
and one is from a non-Annex 1 Party), as well as a geographical balance within these 
two groups.70  
 
A closer examination of the UNFCCC Roster of Experts71 reveals that almost all 
reviewers work in government departments for their national governments, and many 
…  
68 Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, at para. 23.  
69 Ibid, at para. 25. 
70 Herold, n. 39 above, at p. 135.  
71 UNFCCC, n. 29 above. 
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are involved in the preparation of their own country’s emissions inventory.72 On a 
pragmatic level, this may provide members with valuable insights into the processes 
for preparing and reviewing national emissions inventories. Nonetheless, their 
political independence is drawn into question if they are effectively playing a double 
role as reviewers and those whose work is reviewed. Fransen’s ‘not-for-attribution 
interviews’ with individuals involved in the review process for Annex I national 
communications under the UNFCCC73 indicate that ERT members are ‘reluctant to 
challenge each others’ communications for fear of their own communications being 
challenged’.74 As the same pool75 of reviewers is responsible for reviews of Annex I 
states’ national emissions inventories, and the compliance stakes are higher, this 
tendency is also likely to be evident, and perhaps more pronounced, in the Kyoto 
compliance system. Thus, the practices that allow reviewers to serve these double 
roles are out of step with the ‘spirit’ of the rules and procedures, which codify more 
rigorous standards of impartiality.  
 
The intended political neutrality and rigour of the review process is reflected in the 
following requirement of Decision 22/CMP.1: 
 
Each expert review team shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical 
assessment of information submitted under Article 7 and shall, under its collective 
responsibility, prepare a review report, assessing the implementation of the 
commitments of the Party included in Annex I and identifying any potential problems 
…  
72 Zahar, n. 15 above, at pp. 423-4. 
73  The largely procedural requirements for non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC relate to 
establishing emissions inventories, emissions mitigations programs and producing national 
communications reports: UNFCCC, n. 10 above, Art. 4(1)(a), (b), and (j). 
74 T. Fransen, ‘Enhancing Today’s MRV Framework to Meet Tomorrow’s Needs: The Role of 
National Communications and Inventories’ (World Resources Institute, 2009) 8, available at: 
http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/national_communications_mrv.pdf. 
75 ERTs are responsible for ‘in-depth review’ of Annex I Parties’ national communications, and 
technical review of their inventories, under the UNFCCC. They are also responsible for the ‘periodic’ 
reviews of national communications and the ‘annual reviews’ of inventories under the Kyoto 
compliance system: A. Zahar, International Climate Change Law and State Compliance (Routledge, 
forthcoming 2015), at p. 41.  
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in, and factors influencing, the fulfilment of commitments. The expert review teams 
shall refrain from making any political judgement ...76 
 
However, guidelines issued by the UNFCCC in 2003 state that one of the aims of 
ERT reviews should be the examination of reported information in a ‘facilitative and 
open manner’. 77  As diplomacy and negotiations are inevitably intertwined with 
facilitative processes,78 it is contradictory to expect ERTs to engage in compliance 
facilitation whilst refraining from ‘making any political judgement’. There thus 
appears to be a tension between the UNFCCC’s 2003 guidance and the CMP’s 
decision in 2006. Although it may be expected that the latter decision would override 
the former guidance, the UNFCCC’s guidance appears to have significantly 
influenced practice.   
 
Zahar, Peel and Godden observe that ‘in fact, the state retains much of its sovereign 
power and the UNFCCC Secretariat carefully manages the ERTs to ensure that their 
attitude is facilitative and respectful of the age-old customs of international law’.79 
This includes ‘considerable give and take’ between the ERT and the state under 
review during a period of facilitative dialogue in which the state can voluntarily revise 
its emission accounts to align with preliminary advice received from ERTs.80 States’ 
ability to revise reported data in line with ERT advice seems to go well beyond one of 
the stated objectives of the ERT process, which is to ‘assist’ Parties to improve their 
emissions reporting and the implementation of their commitments under the 
Protocol.81  
…  
76 Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, at para. 21 (emphasis added). 
77 UNFCCC, n. 61 above, at p. 83. 
78 Klabbers, nn. 6 & 7 above.  
79 Zahar, Peel & Godden, n. 16 above, at p. 104. 
80 Ibid; Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at para. 7. 
81 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at para. 2(c) (emphasis added). See also Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 




Furthermore, Fransen’s interview data collected from ERT members conducting 
reviews of national communications under the UNFCCC suggests that ‘parties at 
times pressure the review teams to alter the language used in the [ERT] reports’.82 
Again, as the compliance stakes are higher under the Kyoto Protocol, which has 
binding emissions targets, this tendency is likely to be exacerbated under the Kyoto 
compliance system. Thus, it appears that both states and ERTs may revise their 
reported information in light of their facilitative dialogue. That is, despite the rule of 
procedure stating that ERTs shall refrain from making any political judgment, 
diplomatic and facilitative decision-making modes have considerable traction in 
practice. The implications of the ERTs being allowed, and even encouraged, to 
assume this political role in the compliance system will be teased out in the following 
discussion.  
 
There appears to be a clear procedure for ERTs’ listing of questions of 
implementation for referral to the Compliance Committee:  
 
Only if an unresolved problem pertaining to language of a mandatory nature in these 
guidelines influencing the fulfillment of commitments still exists after the Party 
included in Annex I has been provided with opportunities to correct the problem 
within the time frames established under the relevant review procedures, shall that 
problem be listed as a question of implementation in the final review reports.83  
 
The literal meaning of this text is that ERTs shall (that is, must) list non-compliance 
with a mandatory requirement of the Kyoto Protocol as a question of implementation 
if the issue is not resolved through dialogue. 84  This appears to align with 
…  
82 Fransen, n. 74 above, at p. 8.  
83 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at para. 8 (emphasis added).  
84 Zahar, n. 15 above, at p. 420. The requirements for facilitative dialogue are provided in Decision 
27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at para. 7. 
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depoliticization aims to the extent that is promotes the consistent treatment of non-
compliance issues according to pre-agreed standards.   
 
However, in practice, the rules of procedure regarding ERTs’ listing of questions of 
implementation for referral to the Compliance Committee have been interpreted as 
vesting discretion in the ERTs to determine if and when they will list a Party’s breach 
of a mandatory rule for action by the Compliance Committee.85  Significantly, it 
appears that ERTs have assumed an ad hoc gatekeepers’ role, referring only eight 
matters to the Compliance Committee since 2006,86 which seems unlikely to reflect 
the full range of compliance issues arising in the first commitment period. One 
explanation for this is that ERTs are engaging in facilitation themselves,87 rather than 
passing such matters up to be dealt with by the Facilitative Branch. A related 
explanation, which similarly underscores the facilitative element of compliance, is 
that states are more willing to negotiate with ERTs to resolve differences than to have 
the matter escalated so as to require a formal compliance determination.88 Either way, 
the extent to which ERTs fulfil their mandate to act independently and hold states to 
account for their emissions obligations continues to be strongly influenced by 
facilitative compliance politics. 
 
A risk associated with these informal and opaque facilitative processes is that 
consistency in addressing compliance issues will be undermined. There appear to 
have been multiple attempts by the Enforcement Branch and the Compliance 
…  
85 Zahar, n. 15 above, at p. 422. This situation is compounded by drafting weaknesses resulting in a 
lack of clarity regarding which requirements are mandatory and which are not: Zahar, n. 75 above, at 
pp. 67-8. 
86 UNFCCC, ‘Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’ (2014), available at: 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/2875.php. 
87 M. Doelle, ‘Early Experience with the Kyoto Compliance System: Possible Lessons for MEA 
Compliance System Design’ (2010) 1(2) Climate Law pp. 237-60, at 260. 
88 Lefeber & Oberthur, n. 26 above, at p. 94.  
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Committee’s plenary to address this issue. For example, in 2010, the Enforcement 
Branch rebuked the ERTs for lack of consistency in listing ‘unresolved problem[s] 
pertaining to language of a mandatory nature’ in ERT reports.89 In March 2010, an 
ERT finalized its review of Bulgaria’s 2009 inventory report, and identified a 
question of implementation concerning Bulgaria’s national system, which triggered 
non-compliance proceedings. Specifically, the ERT concluded that Bulgaria’s 
national system did not operate in accordance with the Guidelines for National 
Systems for the Estimation of Emissions by Sources and Removals by Sinks under 
Article 5(1) of the Kyoto Protocol due to inadequacies in: (1) the country’s 
institutional arrangements; and (2) the arrangements for the technical competence of 
staff within the national system involved in the inventory-development process.90  
 
Significantly, these problems were not new for Bulgaria, and had been identified in 
both in-country and desk reviews by ERTs in the previous two years.91 In line with 
their mandate to assist states to improve their national emissions reporting, 92  in 
previous years the ERTs made suggestions for enhancing Bulgaria’s national system, 
but only engaged the Compliance Committee in relation to these concerns in 2010. In 
their final decision concerning Bulgaria, the Enforcement Branch formally expressed 
concern about the ‘lack of clarity’ in this ERT report:  
 
During its implementation, the branch noted with concern the lack of clarity in the 
2010 [Annual Review Report], which does not clearly explain why unresolved 
questions did not result in the listing of questions of implementation pursuant to 
paragraph 8 of the annex to decision 22/CMP.1. In particular, differing interpretations 
of this provision may lead to different conclusions as to whether an unresolved problem 
is required to be listed as a question of implementation. This reveals more systematic 
…  
89 Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, at para. 8. 
90 Compliance Committee, Report of the Review of the Annual Submission of Bulgaria Submitted in 
2009, CC-2010-1-1/Bulgaria/EB, 17 Mar. 2010, at para. 200. 
91 M. Doelle, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in the Climate Change Regime’ in E. J. Hollo, K. 
Kulovesi & M. Mehling, Climate Change and the Law (Springer, 2012), pp. 165-88, at 182. 
92 Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, at paras. 2(c), 5 and 7.  
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issues that concern the review process under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
compliance system as a whole, which require urgent attention.93 
 
This comment by the Enforcement Branch underscores both the facilitative dimension 
of ERTs’ roles, and implies a rebuke of ERTs exercising undue discretion in deciding 
when to list questions of implementation and thus escalate compliance matters.  
 
These types of concerns have been echoed by the Compliance Committee’s plenary. 
For example, in the 2011 Annual Report of the Compliance Committee, the plenary 
‘recommended’ that future ERT reports include a list of problems identified in the 
review process, providing reasons as to whether or not each problem relates to 
language of a mandatory nature, and if the ERT decides not to list such a problem as a 
question of implementation, an explanation of the basis for this decision.94 Thus, it 
appears that the plenary was seeking to enhance ERTs’ consistency and accountability 
through imposing reason-giving requirements.95 Further, in 2012, both branches and 
the bureau of the Compliance Committee proposed a joint workshop with ERT lead 
reviewers focused on the issue of improving the consistency of reviews,96 which was 
held in Bonn, Germany, in March 2013.97 Thus, there has been ongoing concern about 
the fairness of the discretionary elements in ERTs’ decision-making processes, and 
concerted attempts to rectify this issue. 
…  
93 Compliance Committee, Decision under Paragraph 2 of Section X, CC-2010-1-17/Bulgaria/EB, 4 
Feb. 2011, at para. 14.  
94 Compliance Committee, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Seventh Session, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/5, 3 Nov. 2011, para. 28, available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/05.pdf. 
95 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, n. 33 above, at p. 39. 
96 Compliance Committee, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Eighth Session, 8 Nov. 2012, para. 
28, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/eng/06.pdf. 
97 Compliance Committee, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Ninth Session,  





3.3. Are ERTs Appropriately Equipped to Engage in Facilitation?  
The appropriateness of technical experts engaging in diplomatic facilitation of 
compliance deserves further unpacking. It is notable that the designers of the Kyoto 
compliance system departed from common practice in other major global MEAs, 
including the Montreal Protocol 98  and the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,99 where UN-sponsored bureaucracies 
or political bodies play pivotal roles in facilitating compliance.100 By contrast, the 
Kyoto compliance system vests facilitative decision-making authority in the ERTs 
and the Facilitative Branch, which are both ostensibly comprised of independent 
experts.101 As will be elaborated in the following Part, the facilitative roles played by 
the ERTs have meant that the Facilitative Branch, which was specifically designed for 
this purpose, has been rendered obsolete. In effect, therefore, the small teams of 
experts comprising ERTs have assumed the chief responsibility for facilitating Annex 
I states’ compliance with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. This raises a 
question about whether the technical experts conducting expert reviews are in fact 
suitably equipped to be engaging in the high level politics associated with facilitating 
states’ compliance with their international environmental commitments.  
 
As previously indicated, most reviewers are national government bureaucrats, 
…  
98 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987, Montreal (Canada) 16 Sept. 
1987, in force 1 Jan. 1989, available at: http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/Treaties/treaties_decisions-
hb.php?sec_id=5. 
99 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 1973, 
Washington DC (USA), 3 Mar. 1973, in force 1 Jul. 1975, available at: 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php 
100 See, eg, A. Fodella, ‘Structural and Institutional Aspects of Non-Compliance Mechanisms’ in 
Treves et al., n. 5 above, at p. 360.  
101 See n. 19 above. 
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however a handful have come from other career backgrounds such as academia.102 
Such backgrounds may equip members well to deal with the technical dimensions of 
emissions review. However, if ERTs are playing a vital role in facilitating 
compliance, it is arguable that a background in international diplomacy and 
negotiations is at least desirable, and arguably indispensable, for engaging in high 
stakes political compliance negotiations.  
 
The administrative apparatus of the Kyoto compliance system may be seen to be 
‘embedded’ within a broader, state-sanctioned space for political negotiation103 in the 
UNFCCC as an MEA. From this vantage, the political ‘embeddedness’ of actors 
within the Kyoto compliance system, including members of ERTs who as previously 
mentioned may play roles as both reviewers and those whose work is reviewed, is 
arguably desirable. According to this view, members’ ‘understanding of diverse 
interests, as well as the ability to engage with actors credibly in a deliberative 
manner’104 may in fact be productive and contribute to the legitimacy and smooth 
functioning of the administrative apparatus in practice.  
 
In this instance, however, the facilitative role of experts in the ERTs appears to go 
beyond constructive embeddedness. Here, the mantle of ‘expertise’ appears to belie 
sensitive political negotiations occurring behind the scenes, and it is doubtful that 
technical experts are best qualified for these types of roles. A more open 
acknowledgement of the dual nature of ERTs’ functions, and the limits of expertise in 
these political settings, raises questions about whether multidisciplinary teams, 
comprised of both technical experts and skilled diplomats/negotiators, would be better 
…  
102 UNFCCC, n. 29 above.  




equipped to fulfill ERTs’ diverse responsibilities. Such an arrangement may well be 
able to combine the legitimacy benefits associated with both expert decision-making 
and diplomatic politics in this setting. As it appears likely that internationally 
coordinated expert review teams will remain a central plank of future compliance 
processes in the emerging international climate regime, it is perhaps timely to 
consider reforming the team composition requirements for ERTs in this vein.105  
 
4. DEPOLITICIZING THE COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE: A MIXED 
RECORD 
4.1. The Significance of Bypassing the Facilitative Branch 
As indicated previously, ERTs exercise discretion to determine which matters will be 
passed up to the Compliance Committee. In the first commitment period, the bureau 
referred all eight substantive compliance matters escalated by the ERTs to the 
Enforcement Branch. Only one substantive submission was made to the Facilitative 
Branch by South Africa on behalf of the G-77 and China back in 2006 – that is, 
before the start of the first commitment period – but it did not proceed due to a failure 
of the Branch members to agree on a procedural issue.106  
 
The limited recourse to the Facilitative Branch in the first commitment period is 
largely attributable to the pivotal role played by the ERTs in facilitating 
compliance,107 which rendered the role of the Facilitative Branch largely obsolete. 
The Secretariat, which as previously noted, carefully manages the ERTs ‘to ensure 
their attitude is facilitative and respectful of the age-old customs of international 
…  
105 See further discussion in Part 5 below. 
106 M. Doelle, n. 91 above, at pp. 171-2. 
107 Lefeber & Oberthur, n. 26 above, at p. 99. 
	 24
	
law’,108 appears to endorse the assumption of facilitative responsibilities by the ERTs 
in the Facilitative Branch’s place. An additional factor contributing to the Facilitative 
Branch’s moribund state in the first commitment period was the lack of a trigger for 
its early-warning function.109 Since 2011, the Branch has attempted to rectify this 
issue and clarify its mandate by re-interpreting the Branch’s rules in a way that give it 
an effective role in advice provision and addressing early-warning issues. However, it 
has achieved minimal success in establishing a meaningful niche for itself vis-à-vis 
the facilitative roles played by the ERTs.110 
 
Significantly, there are numerous due process requirements for matters heard before 
the Facilitative Branch, including rights of the Party concerned to: (1) representation; 
(2) submit information for consideration; (3) comment in writing on other information 
relied upon, and on the final decision; and (4) to request translation of relevant 
documents into one of the six official UN languages. In addition, decisions of the 
Facilitative Branch must include conclusions and reasons.111 Although ERTs must 
take into account information submitted by the Parties, and provide some conclusions 
and reasons in their ERT reports, there are far fewer procedural safeguards governing 
ERTs’ facilitative work. This effectively equates to a sanctioned bypassing of the 
Facilitative Branch’s more formal processes and procedural safeguards, in favour of 
less transparent and accountable facilitative processes undertaken by ERTs. 
 
According to proponents of global administrative law, the types of due process 
guarantees built into the Facilitative Branch’s design may enhance the legitimacy of 
…  
108 See n. 79 above. 
109 Oberthur, n. 52 above, at p. 40; Zahar, n. 75 above, at p. 72.  
110 Zahar, n. 75 above, at pp. 72-4, 79-82.  
111 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section VIII. 
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its decision-making processes.112 If utilized, the Facilitative Branch may represent a 
legitimate ‘procedurally constrained space for political negotiations’113 that would 
help to ameliorate the risk that compliance becomes subject to power politics.114 A 
closer examination of the bypassing of the Facilitative Branch raises questions about 
whether, despite the specifically-designed procedures seeking to safeguard 
compliance from undue politicization, there remains an underlying preference for 
traditional facilitative and cooperative political approaches to resolving compliance 
issues in IEL.115 
 
4.2. Risks of Politicization in the Enforcement Branch  
The Enforcement Branch, like the ERTs, reviews states’ compliance with their treaty 
obligations. In contrast to the ERTs, the Enforcement Branch has recourse to a 
significantly wider array of information sources, including ERT reports and 
information provided by: the Party concerned; the COP to the UNFCCC; the CMP; 
the subsidiary bodies; competent intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations; and external experts.116 Thus, the capacity of the Enforcement Branch 
to meaningfully review Parties’ compliance with their obligations under the Protocol 
is considerably greater than that of the ERTs. This may be considered appropriate to 
legitimate the authority to impose consequences for non-compliance vested in the 
Enforcement Branch. The practical utility of these extensive review powers is, 
however, drawn into question given the bottleneck created by the ERTs, whose 
decisions are based on far more limited information.  
…  
112 See n. 33 above. 
113 Dubash & Morgan, n. 13 above, at p. 289; Schrefler, n. 23 above, at pp. 77-80. 
114 Tanzi & Pitea, n. 5 above, at p. 573; Klabbers, n. 7 above. 
115 See nn. 2-4 above.  





As with the ERTs and the Facilitative Branch, there are requirements for the expert 
members of the Compliance Committee to be independent. Members of the 
Compliance Committee ‘shall serve in their individual capacities’ 117  as technical 
experts, rather than as state representatives, and shall ‘act in an independent and 
impartial manner and avoid real or apparent conflicts of interest’.118 Further, they 
must take a written oath of services, vouching that their role will be undertaken 
‘honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously’ and with full disclosure of 
any potential conflicts of interest.119 A complaint procedure has been established for 
alleged conflicts of interest or incompatibility with ‘the requirements of independence 
and impartiality’.120 From a depoliticization standpoint, these appear to be desirable 
requirements for persons engaging in quasi-judicial121 decision-making.  
 
The CMP’s decision-making regarding funding arrangements, which are obviously 
informed by pragmatic budget constraints, place some strain on the practical 
implementation of these independence and impartiality requirements. In the case of 
developed states,122 due to lack of centrally-provided funding, it is the Party who 
nominated the expert that pays for their expenses, and ‘[s]ome governments have 
…  
117 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section II, para. 6. 
118 Decision 4/CMP.2, n. 43 above, at rule 4.1. 
119 Ibid, at rule 4.2.  
120 Ibid, at rule 4.4.  
121 The UNFCCC Secretariat has said that the Compliance Committee is ‘neither an international 
organization nor an international court. … The function of the enforcement branch may, however, be 
described as “quasi-judicial”, in the sense that the branch determines whether states have complied 
with their legal obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and it applies predetermined consequences in 
cases of non-compliance’: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Secretariat, Procedural Requirements and the Scope and Content of Applicable Law for the 
Consideration of Appeals under Decision 27/CMP.1 and Other Relevant Decisions of the Conference 
of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Approach 
Taken by other Relevant International Bodies Relating to Denial of Due Process, Technical Paper, 
FCCC/TP/2011/6, at para. 43. 
122 The travel and subsistence expenses of representatives from some developing and low-income 
countries are reimbursed by the Secretariat: Lefeber & Oberthur, n. 26 above, at pp. 83-4. 
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questioned whether they should provide such reimbursement if they cannot instruct 
the member or alternate nominated by them to serve the interests of that state’.123 
Repeated requests for the CMP to provide funding for all regular and alternate 
members of the Enforcement Branch in the interests of independence and neutrality 
have been unsuccessful.124  
 
A further risk of politicization and partisanship stems from the possibility that 
members of the Compliance Committee may concurrently serve as a member of a 
delegation to a meeting under the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. This appeared to 
be an issue in an appeal made to the CMP that was initiated by Croatia in 2010, but 
which was subsequently withdrawn with no reasons provided. 125  In the appeal 
documentation, it was claimed that a conflict of interest existed as an alternate 
member of the Enforcement Branch ‘was also a member of the EU delegation at 
COP-12 in Nairobi which had expressed its reservation regarding the applicability of 
the flexibility under decision 7/CP.12 for Croatia to the Kyoto Protocol’.126  The 
Compliance Committee has recommended that ‘due diligence’ be exercised in such 
potential conflict of interest cases.127  
 
It should be noted, however, that risks of partisanship stemming from national 
funding sources and national interest representation at negotiations are common 
…  
123 Ibid, at p. 84, reflecting on their personal experiences as members of the Enforcement Branch. 
124 Ibid, at pp. 83-4. 
125 Decision 14/CMP.7, Appeal by Croatia against a Final Decision of the Enforcement Branch of the 
Compliance Committee in Relation to the Implementation of Decision 7/CP.12, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.2, 15 Mar. 2012, at para. 1.  
126 Kyoto Protocol, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties 
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Sixth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/6, 8 
Oct. 2010, at para. 53; see also Ulfstein, n. 12 above, at p. 420. 
127 Kyoto Protocol, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties 
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/6, 8 Oct. 2010, at 
para. 50.  
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problems besetting all international organizations.128 They do not necessarily imply a 
failure or significant limitation of depoliticization attempts. Rather, notwithstanding 
the risks outlined above, it is suggested that the reliance on experts in the 
Enforcement Branch represents a high level of depoliticization vis-à-vis other global 
MEA compliance processes.   
 
4.3. Successful Attempts to Insulate Compliance Decision-making from Undue 
Political Interference 
In IEL (and indeed international law more broadly), there is a risk that without 
adequate procedural safeguards, compliance will be strongly shaped by the 
differences in power among the Parties.129 In contrast to the flexible and discretionary 
approaches that typically characterize MEA compliance systems,130 the rules of the 
Enforcement Branch provide an ‘automatic review approach’ for different types of 
non-compliance.131 As noted above, these include the requirement of deductions from 
future emissions allocations if a Party’s emission target is exceeded, a ‘compliance 
action plan’ for remedying non-compliance with methodological and reporting 
requirements, and states’ suspension from participating in the Protocol’s flexibility 
mechanisms if the non-compliance issue concerns the eligibility requirements. 132 
Notably, the Enforcement Branch appears to have successfully adhered to procedures 




128 Fodella, n. 100 above, at pp. 362-3. 
129 Tanzi & Pitea, n. 5 above, at p. 573; Klabbers, n. 7 above. 
130 Bodansky, n. 3 above, at p. 251; Klabbers, n. 6 above, at pp. 996-7. 
131 Brunnee, n. 15 above, at p. 306. 
132 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XV, paras. 5(a), (b) and (c). 
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Consistent consequences have been applied in each of the eight substantive 
compliance matters decided before the Enforcement Branch to date.133 Six of the eight 
compliance matters have involved eligibility requirements, simultaneously raising 
questions of methodology and reporting, meaning that the consequences applied 
included both exclusion from the flexibility mechanisms and a requirement to produce 
a compliance action plan. In the case of Canada heard in 2008, the Enforcement 
Branch deemed that Canada had rectified the factual issues that had originally 
catalyzed the question of implementation in relation to reporting and methodological 
requirements, and no consequences were applied.134 In the most recent case heard by 
the Enforcement Branch against Slovakia for non-compliance with methodological 
and reporting requirements in 2012, the consequence applied was the requirement for 
a compliance action plan to be submitted within three months. Thus the consequences 
applied in practice appear to treat analogous cases similarly according to ascertainable 
rules, aligning with the ideals of depoliticization and the ‘assurance of legality’ in 
global regulatory bodies.135  
 
4.4. Appeals to the CMP 
A Party can appeal to the CMP against a decision of the Enforcement Branch if it 
believes it has been denied due process and the decision ‘relates to’ Article 3(1) of the 
Kyoto Protocol.136 This indicates that Parties do not have a right to appeal against all 
Enforcement Branch decisions, including on the grounds of other legal and technical 
…  
133 The eight substantive matters that have been decided by the Enforcement Branch to date concern 
Greece, Canada, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Lithuania and Slovakia: UNFCCC, n. 86 above. 
134 More broadly, however, the inability of the Kyoto compliance system to address or resolve 
Canada’s non-compliance with its first commitment period target, which ultimately led to Canada’s 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, resulted in ‘heavy criticism of the compliance system as a 
whole’: Lefeber & Oberthur, n. 26 above, at p. 99.  
135 This is one of the aims of global administrative law: see Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, n. 33 above, 
at p. 28.  
136 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XI, para. 1. 
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errors. If the CMP agrees by a three-quarters majority vote that there has been a lack 
of due process, it can ‘override’ the decision and the matter will be referred back to 
the Enforcement Branch.137  
 
These provisions are yet to be tested – as previously mentioned, although Croatia 
initiated an appeal against a final decision of the Enforcement Branch in January 
2010, it withdrew the appeal in August 2011 without providing reasons. 138  The 
compliance procedures and mechanisms under Decision 27/CMP.1 do not specify that 
the Compliance Committee’s duty to make information available to the Party 
concerned139 includes a duty to disclose relevant procedural issues, such as potential 
conflicts of interest, that may be grounds for review.140 Thus, in practice, it seems 
likely that this appeals route will continue to serve a largely symbolic function. 
 
It is significant that the CMP, a political organ, does not have the authority to make a 
substantive decision on compliance or to overrule such a decision made by the more 
independent Compliance Committee.141 Thus, the avenues of review to the CMP are 
deliberately limited to minimize the possibility of political interference with the quasi-
judicial decision-making of the Enforcement Branch,142 which is an unusual limitation 
on the power of states in international law.  
 
In sum, the Kyoto compliance system has attempted to insulate all tiers of its 
compliance hierarchy from undue political influence – through review teams and a 
…  
137 Ibid, at section XI. 
138 Decision 14/CMP.7, n. 125 above, at para. 1. 
139 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section VII, paras. 4 and 5; section VIII, para. 7; and section IX, 
para. 6.  
140 UNFCCC Secretariat, n. 121 above, at para. 31.  
141 Ibid, at para. 37. However, the CMP does have authority to change the substantive rule upon which 
the non-compliance is based: ibid. 
142 Lefeber & Oberthur, n. 26 above, at p. 85. 
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Compliance Committee comprised of experts, and by limiting the accountability of 
these bodies to the Parties serving as the CMP. However, politics has crept back into 
this system through ERTs’ facilitative roles, allowing the circumvention of the 
numerous procedural safeguards built into the system’s design.  
 
5. THE CURRENT AND LIKELY FUTURE COMPLIANCE TRAJECTORIES 
UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE REGIME 
This Part will outline likely future compliance trajectories under the international 
climate regime, and assess them in light of the foregoing analysis. In particular, there 
appears to be a strong likelihood of continuing and even greater reliance on 
internationally coordinated expert review processes in the future, reinforcing the 
salience of the foregoing critiques of the multiple roles played by ERTs.  
 
At the eighth CMP in Doha in December 2012, a significantly reduced number of 
states, accounting for 22% of global emissions,143 committed to the Kyoto Protocol’s 
second commitment period from 2013-2020. The second commitment period, which 
commenced on 1 January 2013, allows a continuation of the Protocol’s legal 
requirements and preserves the flexibility, accounting, review and compliance 
mechanisms established under the first commitment period.144 Significantly, however, 
as of November 2014, the Doha Amendment is yet to legally enter into force.145 This 
…  
143 This figure was calculated by Rajamani: L. Rajamani, ‘The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
and the Future of the Climate Regime’ (2012) 61(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp.  
501-18, at 516. 
144 United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, ‘At UN Climate Conference in Doha, Governments 
Take Next Essential Steps in Global Response to Climate Change’ (Press Release, 8 Dec. 2012), 
available at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/press_releases_advisories/application/pdf/pr20120812_cop18_cl 
ose.pdf, at p. 2. 
145 United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Chapter XXVII Environment: 7.c Doha Amendment to the 




relatively bleak state of affairs raises questions about the future of the Kyoto Protocol 
and of compliance under the UNFCCC.  
 
The ongoing negotiations regarding the international climate regime’s future have 
been structured along two parallel tracks – the Kyoto Protocol track, which lacks US 
support, and the UNFCCC track, which has the advantage of comprehensive 
coverage.146 In recent COP negotiations, most notably in Copenhagen (2009) and 
Cancun (2010), there has been a marked shift away from the Kyoto Protocol’s top 
down ‘prescriptive, quantitative, time-bound, compliance-backed approach’ to a 
privileging of decentralized, bottom up selection of national mitigation targets and 
actions, reinforced by robust reporting frameworks.147 The latter involves steps to 
strengthen the system of reporting and verification under the UNFCCC for all 
countries. In particular, international assessment and review (IAR) processes will 
apply to developed countries’ greenhouse gas inventories, biennial reports and 
national communications, 148  and international consultation and analysis (ICA) 
processes will apply to developing countries’ biennial update reports.149 IAR is to be a 
‘robust, rigorous and transparent process’ undertaken by ERTs, ‘with a view to 
promoting comparability and confidence’.150 By contrast, ICA is intended to ‘increase 
bo 
c&chapter=27&lang=en. In order for this amendment to enter into force, an instrument of acceptance 
must be received by the Depositary from at least three fourths of the Parties to the Protocol: Kyoto 
Protocol, n. 9 above, at Art. 20(4).  
146 L. Rajamani, ‘Addressing the “Post-Kyoto” Stress Disorder: Reflections on the Emerging Legal 
Architecture of the Climate Regime’ (2009) 58(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 
803-34, at 830. 
147 Rajamani, Brunnee & Doelle, n. 11 above, at p. 7; L. Rajamani, ‘The Cancun Climate Agreement: 
Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves’ (2011) 60(2) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, pp. 499-519.  
148 Decision 1/CP.16, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun 
from 29 November to 10 December 2010, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2011, at para. 44; 
Decision 23/CP.19, Work Programme on the Revision of the Guidelines for the Review of Biennial 
Reports and National Communications, Including National Inventory Reviews, for Developed Country 
Parties, Advance Unedited Version. 
149 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 148 above, at para. 63. 
150 Ibid, at para. 44.  
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transparency of mitigation actions and their effects’ through a process conducted by a 
team of technical experts151  that is ‘non-intrusive, non-punitive and respectful of 
national sovereignty’,152 thus perpetuating a milder form of differential treatment for 
developed and developing countries.153 The first round of IAR commenced in March 
2014, two months after the first biennial reports of developed countries were due on 1 
January 2014.154 Non-Annex I developing countries’ first round of biennial reports 
are due by December 2014,155 with ICA set to commence shortly thereafter. 
 
Both the IAR and ICA processes envisage multilateral oversight of the review process 
by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC.156 Developed countries’ biennial reports, and the reports resulting from 
their assessment and review, will undergo a ‘multilateral assessment’, and developing 
countries’ biennial update reports, and the reports resulting from their consultation 
and analysis processes, will be subject to a ‘facilitative sharing of views’.157 The 
outcomes of the multilateral assessment phase of IAR will be a set of SBI 
conclusions, informed by a record of relevant documents and proceedings prepared by 
the Secretariat, which are to be forwarded to ‘relevant bodies under the Convention as 
appropriate’.158 A ‘summary report and a record of the facilitative sharing of views’ 
…  
151 The majority of these technical experts will be from developing countries: Decision 20/CP.19, 
Composition, Modalities and Procedures of the Team of Technical Experts under International 
Consultation and Analysis, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.2, Annex, at para 5. 
152 Ibid, at para. 63.  
153 On the trend towards greater symmetry of obligations for developed and developing countries in the 
evolving climate regime, see generally Rajamani, n. 143 above, at pp. 507-10. 
154 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘International Assessment and Review 
Process’ (2014), available at: 
https://unfccc.int/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/international_assessment_and_review/item
s/7549.php. 
155 UNFCCC, ‘National Communications and Biennial Update Reports from Non-Annex I Parties’ 
(2014), available at: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/items/2 
156 Oberthur, n. 52 above, at p. 42. 
157 Decision 2/CP.17, ‘Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention’, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, Annexes II and IV.  
158 Ibid, Annex II, paras. 11 and 12.  
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are the only outcomes required for the multilateral phase of ICA. 159  Thus, both 
practices lack enforcement mechanisms, as well as facilitative measures. That is, apart 
from public ‘naming and shaming’, there are no concrete consequences for Parties in 
non-compliance.160 
 
Importantly, the review processes established for IAR at COP 19 in Warsaw (2013)161 
draw extensively upon, and largely mirror, the requirements for reporting and expert 
review of national emissions inventories under the Kyoto Protocol. If the Kyoto 
compliance system is conceptualized as consisting of four rungs – national reporting, 
internationally coordinated expert review, determinations by the Compliance 
Committee, and responsibility for appeals vested in the CMP162 – IAR can be seen to 
substantially replicate the first two rungs of this process. Thus, it is timely to reflect 
upon lessons from such review processes under the Kyoto compliance system that 
may be salient for transplantation to another part of the international climate regime.  
 
Moreover, such lessons may have relevance to the development of compliance 
processes under a future international climate agreement. At the Doha Conference, 
governments agreed to a ‘firm timetable to adopt a universal climate agreement by 
2015’ under the UNFCCC, with a view to its entry into force in 2020.163 Striking a 
politically palatable balance between the objectives of environmental effectiveness, 
climate equity and developed Parties’ concerns about a level playing field will 
constitute a primary challenge for negotiators of the new global climate 
…  
159 Ibid, Annex IV, para. 8. 
160 Oberthur, n. 52 above, at p. 43.  
161 Decision 23/CP.1, n. 148 above. 
162 Zahar, Peel & Godden, n. 16 above, at p. 106. 
163 United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, n. 144 above, at pp. 1-2. 
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architecture. 164  Under such an agreement, it appears unlikely that the Kyoto 
Protocol’s current compliance system will be replicated in its entirety;165 indeed, the 
IAR/ICA model may provide the most accurate approximation of a future roadmap. It 
is suggested, however, that the effectiveness of such review processes will be 
significantly enhanced if they are buttressed by multilateral non-compliance 
responses, including measures to promote compliance.166  
 
Thus, national reporting and internationally coordinated expert review appear likely to 
be retained as features of compliance processes in the international climate regime. In 
light of this, it is proposed that there are two reform options that may place 
appropriate procedural constraints on facilitative compliance politics. Within the 
Kyoto compliance system, it is suggested that ERTs should be limited to undertaking 
more technical and procedural roles, in line with their expertise. This is consonant 
with the Compliance Committee’s recent attempts to enhance the consistency of 
ERTs’ processes,167 and may require clarification and re-specification of the rules and 
guidelines pertaining to ERTs to remove references to ‘facilitative’ and ‘assistance’-
based roles. This would then provide scope for the Facilitative Branch to assume a 
more comprehensive facilitative role, safeguarded by due process guarantees, in 
accordance with its mandate.  
 
However, if as appears likely, the future compliance trajectories under the UNFCCC 
include a significant role for ERTs without oversight by the Compliance Committee, 
…  
164 N. K. Dubash & L. Rajamani, ‘Beyond Copenhagen: Next Steps’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy, pp. 
593-9, at 596-8. 
165 Rajamani, Brunnee & Doelle, n. 11 above, at p. 7.  
166 Oberthur proposes five options for the compliance mechanism for a 2015 agreement, and assesses 
both their likely effectiveness and political feasibility: Oberthur, n. 52 above, at pp. 44-9.  
167 See nn. 94-7 above. 
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the rules guiding ERTs’ composition and processes should be revised to explicitly 
reflect the diverse responsibilities that ERTs currently bear. This may include rules 
promoting an appropriate mix of technical and diplomatic skills in team composition, 
and guidelines for enhancing the consistency of ERTs’ decision-making processes in 
line with pre-agreed standards. This option, therefore, involves ERTs playing a more 
openly acknowledged and procedurally constrained role in facilitating compliance.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The Kyoto compliance system is exceptional in terms of its attempts to insulate 
compliance decision-making from international politics. These aims appear to have 
been achieved to a large extent in the work of the Enforcement Branch, which is 
comprised of legal experts and has a record of fair and consistent, rather than 
politicized, treatment of compliance matters. Despite these laudable efforts, this 
article has demonstrated the persistence of political and facilitative forms of decision-
making, particularly through the ERTs as gatekeepers of the compliance system. 
These small groups of experts have created a bottleneck limiting the number of cases 
that are heard by the Compliance Committee, which does not appear to reflect the full 
extent of Annex I Parties’ compliance issues under the first commitment period.  
 
The ERTs’ pivotal roles in facilitating compliance are out of step with the compliance 
rules and procedures which suggest a more circumscribed and predominantly 
technical role for ERTs, and a more extensive, yet procedurally constrained, 
facilitative role for the Facilitative Branch. As ERTs’ roles in practice exceed their 
mandates on the books, there are arguably inadequate safeguards regarding their skills 
mix and decision-making processes, and oversight by other expert and political bodies 
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in the compliance hierarchy, raising legitimacy concerns. One consequence of ERTs 
engaging in informal and opaque facilitative processes is that the reliability and 
consistency of review processes designed to provide external quality checks on states’ 
reported emissions information may be compromised. Significant decisions regarding 
states’ compliance with their international environmental commitments are made on 
the basis of this reported information, underscoring the importance of impartial and 
autonomous review processes. Thus, ongoing efforts to discipline politics are 
desirable to enhance both the legitimacy and quality of compliance processes in the 
international climate regime.  
 
In practical terms, this may be achieved by modifying the rules governing ERTs to 
more explicitly limit their roles to technical review. This will provide greater scope 
for the Facilitative Branch to fulfil its mandate for the future operation of the Kyoto 
compliance system. In the likely future compliance trajectories under the UNFCCC, a 
predominant reliance on the ERT process, in the absence of the multi-tiered 
compliance hierarchy that buttressed the functions of the ERTs in the first 
commitment period, is likely to be at strong risk of politicization. Particular attention 
should therefore be paid to ensuring that internationally coordinated expert review 
functions are appropriately constrained by procedures pertaining to skills mix, 
political independence, clearly prescribed decision-making processes and due process 
guarantees in an effort to prevent their vulnerability to power politics.  	
